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Abstract. A tendering is a negotiating process for a contract through by
a tenderer issuing an invitation, bidders submitting bidding documents and
the tenderer accepting a bidding by sending out a notification of award. As
a useful way of purchasing, there are many norms and rulers for it in the
purchasing guides of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, · · ·, also
in contract conditions of various consultant associations. In China, there is
a law and regulation system for tendering and bidding. However, few works
on the mathematical model of a tendering and its evaluation can be found in
publication. The main purpose of this paper is to construct a Smarandache
multi-space model for a tendering, establish an evaluation system for bidding
based on those ideas in the references [7] and [8] and analyze its solution by
applying the decision approach for multiple objectives and value engineering.
Open problems for pseudo-multi-spaces are also presented in the final section.
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condition of successful bidding, decision of multiple objectives, decision of
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AMS(2000): 90B50,90C35,90C90
§1. Introduction
The tendering is an efficient way for purchasing in the market economy. According to
the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the second meeting
of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People’s Congress on March 15,1999),
it is just a civil business through by a tenderer issuing a tendering announcement
or an invitation, bidders submitting bidding documents compiled on the tendering
document and the tenderer accepting a bidding after evaluation by sending out a
notification of award. The process of this business forms a negotiating process of a
contract. In China, there is an interval time for the acceptation of a bidding and
becoming effective of the contract, i.e., the bidding is accepted as the tenderer send
out the notification of award, but the contract become effective only as the tenderer
and the successful bidder both sign the contract.
In the Tendering and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at
the 11th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9th National People’s Congress
on August 30,1999), the programming and liability or obligation of the tenderer,
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the bidders, the bid evaluation committee and the government administration are
stipulated in detail step by step. According to this law, the tenderer is on the side
of raising and formulating rulers for a tender project and the bidders are on the
side of response each ruler of the tender. Although the bid evaluation committee is
organized by the tenderer, its action is independent on the tenderer. In tendering
and bidding law and regulations of China, it is said that any unit or person can
not disturbs works of the bid evaluation committee illegally. The action of them
should consistent with the tendering and bidding law of China and they should place
themselves under the supervision of the government administration.
The role of each partner can be represented by a tetrahedron such as those shown
in Fig.1.
Fig.1¸
The 41th item in the Tendering and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of
China provides conditions for a successful bidder:
(1) optimally responsive all of the comprehensive criterions in the tendering
document;
(2) substantially responsive criterions in the tender document with the lowest
evaluated bidding price unless it is lower than this bidder’s cost.
The conditions (1) and (2) are often called the comprehensive evaluation method
and the lowest evaluated price method. In the same time, these conditions also
imply that the tendering system in China is a multiple objective system, not only
evaluating in the price, but also in the equipments, experiences, achievements, staff
and the programme, etc.. However, nearly all the encountered evaluation methods
in China do not apply the scientific decision of multiple objectives. In where, the
comprehensive evaluation method is simply replaced by the 100 marks and the lowest
evaluated price method by the lowest bidding price method. Regardless of whether
different objectives being comparable, there also exist problems for the ability of
bidders and specialists in the bid evaluation committee creating a false impression
for the successful bidding price or the successful bidder. The tendering and bidding
is badly in need of establishing a scientific evaluation system in accordance with
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these laws and regulations in China. Based on the reference [7] for Smarandache
multi-spaces and the mathematical model for the tendering in [8], the main purpose
of this paper is to establish a multi-space model for the tendering and a scientific
evaluation system for bids by applying the approach in the multiple objectives and
value engineering, which enables us to find a scientific approach for tendering and
its management in practice. Some cases are also presented in this paper.
The terminology and notations are standard in this paper. For terminology and
notation not defined in this paper can be seen in [7] for multi-spaces, in [1]− [3] and
[6] for programming, decision and graphs and in [8] for the tendering and bidding
laws and regulations in China.
§2. A multi-space model for tendering
Under an idea of anti-thought or paradox for mathematics :combining different fields
into a unifying field, Smarandache introduced the conception of multi-spaces in
1969([9]-[12]), including algebraic multi-spaces and multi-metric spaces. The con-
tains the well-known Smarandache geometries([5]− [6]), which can be used to Gen-
eral Relativity and Cosmological Physics([7]). As an application to Social Sciences,
multi-spaces can be also used to establish a mathematical model for tendering.
These algebraic multi-spaces are defined in the following definition.
Definition 2.1 An algebraic multi-space
∑
with multiple m is a union of m sets
A1, A2, · · · , Am
∑
=
m⋃
i=1
Ai,
where 1 ≤ m < +∞ and there is an operation or ruler ◦i on each set Ai such that
(Ai◦i) is an algebraic system for any integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Notice that if i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, there must not be Ai
⋂
Aj = ∅, which are just
correspondent with the characteristics of a tendering. Thereby, we can construct a
Smarandache multi-space model for a tendering as follows.
Assume there are m evaluation items A1, A2, · · · , Am for a tendering A˜ and there
are ni evaluation indexes ai1, ai2, · · · , aini for each evaluation item Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
By applying mathematics, this tendering can be represented by
A˜ =
m⋃
i=1
Ai,
where, for any integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
(Ai, ◦i) = {ai1, ai2, · · · , aini |◦i}
is an algebraic system. Notice that we do not define other relations of the tendering
A˜ and evaluation indexes aij with Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ m unless Ai ⊆ A˜ and aij ∈ Ai in this
multi-space model.
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Now assume there are k, k ≥ 3 bidders R1, R2, · · · , Rk in the tendering A˜ and
the bidding of bidder Rj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k is
Rj(A˜) = Rj

A1
A2
· · ·
Am
 =

Rj(A1)
Rj(A2)
· · ·
Rj(Am)

.
According to the successful bidding criterion in the Tendering and Bidding Law
of the People’s Republic of China and regulations, the bid evaluation committee
needs to determine indexes i1, i2, · · · , ik, where {i1, i2, · · · , ik} = {1, 2, · · · , k} such
that there is an ordered sequence
Ri1(A˜) ≻ Ri2(A˜) ≻ · · · ≻ Rik(A˜)
for these bidding R1(A˜), R2(A˜), · · · , Rk(A˜) of bidders R1, R2, · · · , Rk. Here, these
bidders Ri1 , Ri2 and Ri3 are pre-successful bidders in succession determined by the
bid evaluation committee in the laws and regulations in China.
Definition 2.2 An ordered sequence for elements in the symmetry group Sn on
{1, 2, · · · , m} is said an alphabetical sequence if it is arranged by the following crite-
rions:
(i) (1, 0 · · · , 0)  P for any permutation P ∈ Sn.
(ii) if integers s1, s2, · · · , sh ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, 1 ≤ h < m and permutations (s1, s2,
· · · , sh, t, · · ·), (s1, s2, · · · , sh, l, · · ·) ∈ Sn, then
(s1, s2, · · · , sh, t, · · ·) ≻ (s1, s2, · · · , sh, l, · · ·)
if and only if t < l. Let {xσi}
n
1 be a sequence, where σ1 ≻ σ2 ≻ · · · ≻ σn and σi ∈ Sn
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the sequence {xσi}
n
1 is said an alphabetical sequence.
Now if xσ ≻ xτ , xσ is preferable than xτ in order. If xσ  xτ , then xσ is
preferable or equal with xτ in order. If xσ  xτ and xτ  xσ, then xσ is equal xτ in
order, denoted by xσ ≈ xτ .
We get the following result for an evaluation of a tendering.
Theorem 2.1 Let O1, O2, O3 · · · be ordered sets. If Rj(A˜) ∈ O1×O2×O3× · · · for
any integer j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, then there exists an arrangement i1, i2, · · · , ik for indexes
1, 2, · · · , k such that
Ri1(A˜)  Ri2(A˜)  · · ·  Rik(A˜).
Proof By the assumption, for any integer j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
Rj(A˜) ∈ O1 ×O2 × O3 × · · · .
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Whence, Rj(A˜) can be represented by
Rj(A˜) = (xj1, xj2, xj3, · · ·),
where xjt ∈ Ot, t ≥ 1. Define a set
St = {xjt; 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
Then the set St ⊆ Ot is finite. Because the set Ot is an ordered set, so there exists
an order for elements in St. Not loss of generality, assume the order is
x1t  x2t  · · ·  xmt,
for elements in St. Then we can apply the alphabetical approach to Ri1(A˜), Ri2(A˜),
· · · , Rik(A˜) and get indexes i1, i2, · · · , ik such that
Ri1(A˜)  Ri2(A˜)  · · ·  Rik(A˜). ♮
If we choose Oi, i ≥ 1 to be an ordered function set in Theorem 2.1, particularly,
let O1 = {f}, f : Ai → R, 1 ≤ i ≤ m be a monotone function set and Ot = ∅ for
t ≥ 2, then we get the next result.
Theorem 2.2 Let Rj : Ai → R, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ k be monotone functions. Then
there exists an arrangement i1, i2, · · · , ik for indexes 1, 2, · · · , k such that
Ri1(A˜)  Ri2(A˜)  · · ·  Rik(A˜).
We also get the following consequence for evaluation numbers by Theorem 2.2.
Corollary 2.1 If Rj(Ai) ∈ [−∞,+∞] × [−∞,+∞] × [−∞,+∞] × · · · for any
integers i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, then there exists an arrangement i1, i2, · · · , ik for
indexes 1, 2, · · · , k such that
Ri1(A˜)  Ri2(A˜)  · · ·  Rik(A˜).
Notice that in the above ordered sequence, if we arrange Ris ≻ Ril or Ril ≻ Ris
further in the case of Ris ≈ Ril, s 6= l, then we can get an ordered sequence
Ri1(A˜) ≻ Ri2(A˜) ≻ · · · ≻ Rik(A˜),
and the pre-successful bidders accordance with the laws and regulations in China.
§3. A mathematical analog for bids evaluation
For constructing an evaluation system of bids by the multi-space of tendering, the
following two problems should be solved in the first.
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Problem 1 For any integers i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, how to determine Rj(Ai) on account
of the responsiveness of a bidder Rj on indexes ai1, ai2, · · · , aini?
Problem 2 For any integer j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, how to determine Rj(A˜) on account of
the vector (Rj(A1), Rj(A2), · · · , Rj(Am))
t?
Different approaches for solving Problems 1 and 2 enable us to get different
mathematical analogs for bids evaluation.
3.1. An approach of multiple objectives decision
This approach is originated at the assumption that Rj(A1), Rj(A2), · · · , Rj(Am), 1 ≤
j ≤ m are independent and can not compare under a unified value unit. The
objectives of tendering is multiple, not only in the price, but also in the equipments,
experiences, achievements, staff and the programme, etc., which are also required by
the 41th item in the Tendering and Bidding Law of the People’s Republic of China.
According to Theorems 2.1 − 2.2 and their inference, we can establish a pro-
gramming for arranging the order of each evaluation item Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and getting
an ordered sequence of bids R1(A˜), R2(A˜), · · · , Rk(A˜) of a tendering A˜ =
m⋃
i=1
Ai, as
follows:
STEP 1 determine the order of the evaluation items A1, A2, · · · , Am. For ex-
ample, for m = 5, A1 ≻ A2 ≈ A3 ≻ A4 ≈ A5 is an order of the evaluation items
A1, A2, A3, A4, A5.
STEP 2 for two bids Rj1(Ai), Rj2(Ai), j1 6= j2, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, determine the con-
dition for Rj1(Ai) ≈ Aj2(A2). For example, let A1 be the bidding price. Then
Rj1(A1) ≈ Rj2(A1) providing |Rj1(A)− Rj2(A1)| ≤ 100(10 thousand yuan).
STEP 3 for any integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, determine the order of R1(Ai), R2(Ai),
· · · , Rk(Ai). For example, arrange the order of bidding price from lower to higher
and the bidding programming dependent on the evaluation committee.
STEP 4 alphabetically arrange R1(A˜), R2(A˜), · · · , Rk(A˜), which need an ap-
proach for arranging equal bids Rj1(A˜) ≈ Rj2(A˜) in order. For example, arrange
them by the ruler of lower price preferable and get an ordered sequence
Ri1(A˜) ≻ Ri2(A˜) ≻ · · · ≻ Rik(A˜)
of these bids R1(A˜), R2(A˜), · · · , Rk(A˜).
Notice that we can also get an ordered sequence through by defining the weight
functions
ω(A˜) = H(ω(A1), ω(A2), · · · , ω(Am))
and
ω(Ai) = F (ω(ai1), ω(ai2), · · · , ω(aini)).
For the weight function in detail, see the next section.
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Theorem 3.1 The ordered sequence of bids of a tendering A˜ can be gotten by the
above programming.
Proof Assume there are k bidders in this tendering. Then we can alphabetically
arrange these bids Ri1(A˜), Ri2(A˜), · · · , Rik(A˜) and get
Ri1(A˜)  Ri2(A˜)  · · ·  Rik(A˜).
Now applying the arranging approach in the case of Rj1(A˜) ≈ Rj2(A˜), we finally
obtain an ordered sequence
Ri1(A˜) ≻ Ri2(A˜) ≻ · · · ≻ Rik(A˜). ♮
Example 3.1 There are 3 evaluation items in a building construction tendering A˜
with A1 =price, A2=programming and A3=similar achievements in nearly 3 years.
The order of the evaluation items is A1 ≻ A3 ≻ A2 and Rj1(Ai) ≈ Rj2(Ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
providing |Rj1(A1)− Rj2(A1)| ≤ 150, Rj1(A2) and Rj2(A2) are in the same rank or
the difference of architectural area between Rj1(A3) and Rj2(A3) is not more than
40000m2. For determining the order of bids for each evaluation item, it applies the
rulers that from the lower to the higher for the price, from higher rank to a lower
rank for the programming by the bid evaluation committee and from great to small
amount for the similar achievements in nearly 3 years and arrange Rj1(A˜), Rj2(A˜),
1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ k =bidders by the ruler of lower price first for two equal bids in order
Rj1(A˜) ≈ Rj2(A˜).
There were 4 bidders R1, R2, R3, R4 in this tendering. Their bidding prices are
in table 1.
bidder R1 R2 R3 R4
A1 3526 3166 3280 3486
table 1¸
Applying the arrangement ruler for A1, the order for R2(A1), R3(A1), R4(A1),
R1(A1) is
R2(A1) ≈ R3(A1) ≻ R4(A1) ≈ R1(A1).
The evaluation order for A2 by the bid evaluation committee is R3(A2) ≈ R2(A2) ≻
R1(A2) ≻ R4(A2). They also found the bidding results for A3 are in table 2.
bidder R1 R2 R3 R4
A3(m
2) 250806 210208 290108 300105
table 2¸
Whence the order of R4(A3), R3(A3), R1(A3), R2(A3) is
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R4(A3) ≈ R3(A3) ≻ R1(A3) ≈ R2(A3).
Therefore, the ordered sequence for these bids R1(A˜), R2(A˜), R3(A˜) and R4(A˜) is
R3(A˜) ≻ R2(A˜) ≻ R4(A˜) ≻ R1(A˜).
Let the order of evaluation items be A1 ≻ A2 ≻ · · · ≻ Am. Then we can also
get the ordered sequence of a tendering by applying a graphic method. By the
terminology in graph theory, to arrange these bids of a tendering is equivalent to
find a directed path passing through all bidders R1, R2, · · · , Rk in a graph G[A˜]
defined in the next definition. Generally, the graphic method is more convenience in
the case of less bidders, for instance 7 bidders for a building construction tendering
in China.
Definition 3.1 Let R1, R2, · · · , Rk be all these k bidders in a tendering A˜ =
m⋃
i=1
Ai.
Define a directed graph G[A˜] = (V (G[A˜]), E(G[A˜])) as follows.
V (G[A˜]) = {R1, R2, · · · , Rk} × {A1, A2, · · · , Am},
E(G[A˜]) = E1
⋃
E2
⋃
E3.
Where E1 consists of all these directed edges (Rj1(Ai), Rj2(Ai)), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤
j1, j2 ≤ k and Rj1(Ai) ≻ Rj2(Ai) is an adjacent order. Notice that if Rs(Ai) ≈
Rl(Ai) ≻ Rj(Ai), then there are Rs(Ai) ≻ Rj(Ai) and Rl(Ai) ≻ Rj(Ai) simulta-
neously. E2 consists of edges Rj1(Ai)Rj2(Ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ k, where
Rj1(Ai) ≈ Rj2(Ai) and E3 = {Rj(Ai)Rj(Ai+1)|1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k}.
For example, the graph G[A˜] for Example 3.1 is shown in Fig.2.
Fig.2¸
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Now we need to find a directed path passing through R1, R2, R3, R4 with start
vertex R2(A1) or R3(A1). By the ruler in an alphabetical order, we should travel
starting from the vertex R3(A1) passing through A2, A3 and then arriving at A1.
Whence, we find a direct path correspondent with the ordered sequence
R3(A˜) ≻ R2(A˜) ≻ R4(A˜) ≻ R1(A˜).
3.2. An approach of simply objective decision
This approach is established under the following considerations for Problems 1 and
2.
Consideration 1 In these evaluation items A1, A2, · · · , Am of a tendering A˜, seek
the optimum of one evaluation item. For example, seek the lowest bidding price in a
construction tendering for a simply building or seek the optimum of design scheme
in a design project tendering, etc..
Consideration 2 The value of these evaluation items A1, A2, · · · , Am is comparable
which enables us to measure each of them by a unify unit and to construct various
weighted functions on them. For example, the 100 marks and the lowest evaluated
price method widely used in China are used under this consideration.
3.2.1. The optimum of one objective
Assume the optimal objective being A1 in a tendering A˜ =
m⋃
i=1
Ai. We need to deter-
mine the acceptable basic criterions for all other items A2, A3, · · · , Ak, then arrange
R1(A1), R2(A1), · · · , Rl(A1) among these acceptable bids R1, R2, · · · , Rl for items
A2, A3, · · · , Ak in Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For example, evaluating these items A2, A3, · · · , Ak
by qualification or by weighted function on A2, A3, · · · , Ak up to these criterions,
then arrange these acceptable bids R1, R2, · · · , Rl under their response to A1 and
the order of Ri(A˜), Ri(A˜) if Ri(A1) ≈ Rj(A1). According to Theorem 3.1, we get
the following result.
Theorem 3.2 The approach of one optimal objective can get an ordered sequence
of bids for a tendering A˜.
Example 3.2 The optimum of design scheme is the objective in a design project
tendering A˜ which is divided into 5 ranks A,B,C,D,E and other evaluation items
such as human resources, design period and bidding price by a qualifiable approach
if the bidding price is in the interval of the service fee norm of China. The final
order of bids is determined by the order of design schemes with qualifiable human
resources, design period and bidding price and applying the ruler of lower price first
for two equal design scheme in order.
There were 8 bidders in this tendering. Their bidding prices are in table 3.
bidder R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
bidding price 251 304 268 265 272 283 278 296
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table 3¸
After evaluation for these human resources, design period and bidding price, 4
bidders are qualifiable unless the bidder R5 in human resources. The evaluation
result for bidding design schemes is in table 4.
rank A B C D E
design scheme R3R6 R1 R2R8 R7 R4
table 4¸
Therefore, the ordered sequence for bids is
R3(
˜
A) ≻ R6(A˜) ≻ R1(A˜) ≻ R8(A˜) ≻ R2(A˜) ≻ R7(A˜) ≻ R4(A˜).
Example 3.3 The optimum objective in a tendering A˜ for a construction of a
dwelling house is the bidding price A1. All other evaluation items, such as qualifica-
tions, management persons and equipments is evaluated by a qualifiable approach.
There were 7 bidders Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7 in this tendering. The evaluation of price
is by a weighted function approach, i.e., determine the standard price S first, then
calculate the mark N of each bidder by the following formulae
S =
(
7∑
i=1
Ai −max{Ri(A1)|1 ≤ i ≤ 7} −min{Ri(A1)|1 ≤ i ≤ 7}
5
,
Ni = 100− t× |
Ri(A1)− S
S
| × 100, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7,
where, if Ri(A1)− S > 0 then t = 6 and if Ri(A1)− S < 0 then t = 3.
After evaluation, all bidders are qualifiable in qualifications, management persons
and equipments. Their bidding prices are in table 5.
bidder R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
A1 3518 3448 3682 3652 3490 3731 3436
table 5¸
According to these formulae, we get that S = 3558 and the mark of each bidder
as those shown in table 6.
bidder R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
mark 96.70 91.27 79.12 84.16 94.27 73.84 89.68
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table 6¸
Therefore, the ordered sequence of bids is
R1(A˜) ≻ R5(A˜) ≻ R2(A˜) ≻ R7(A˜) ≻ R4(A˜) ≻ R3(A˜) ≻ R6(A˜).
3.2.2. The pseudo-optimum of multiple objectives
This approach assumes that there is a unifying unit between these evaluation items
A1, A2, · · · , Am in an interval [a, b]. Whence it can be transformed into case 3.2.1
and sought the optimum of one objective. Not loss of generality, we assume the
unifying unit is ̟ and
̟(Ai) = fi(̟), 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
where fi denotes the functional relation of the metric ̟(Ai) with unit ̟. Now the
objective of tendering turns to a programming of one objective
max
̟
F (f1(̟), f2(̟), · · · , fm(̟)) or min
̟
F (f1(̟), f2(̟), · · · , fm(̟)),
where F denotes the functional relation of the tendering A˜ with these evaluation
items A1, A2, · · · , Am, which can be a weighted function, such as a linear function
F (f1(̟), f2(̟), · · · , fm(̟)) =
m∑
i=1
fi(̟)
or an ordered sequence. According to Theorem 3.2, we know the following result.
Theorem 3.3 If the function F of a tendering A˜ only has one maximum value in
[a, b], then there exists an ordered sequence for these bids Ri(A˜), 1 ≤ i ≤ k after
determined how to arrange Ri(A˜) and Rj(A˜) when F (Ri(A˜)) = F (Rj(A˜)), i 6= j.
The 100 marks and the lowest evaluated price method widely used in China both
are applications of this approach. In the 100 marks, the weight function is a linear
function
F (f1(̟), f2(̟), · · · , fm(̟)) =
m∑
i=1
fi(̟)
with 0 ≤ F (f1(̟), f2(̟), · · · , fm(̟)) ≤ 100, fi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In the lowest
evaluated price method, each difference of an evaluation item Ai, 2 ≤ i ≤ m is
changed to the bidding price ̟(A1), i.e.,
fi = (R(Ai)− S(Ai))̟(A1), 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
where S(Ai) is the standard line for Ai, ̟(Ai) is one unit difference of Ai in terms
of A1. The weighted function of the lowest evaluated price method is
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F (̟(A1), f2(̟(A1)), · · · , fm(̟(A1))) = (1 +
m∑
j=2
(R(Ai)− S(Ai)))̟(A1).
For example, we can fix one unit difference of a technological parameter 15, i.e.,
̟(A1) = 15 ten thousand dollars in terms of the bidding price.
§4. Weighted functions and their construction
We discuss weighted functions on the evaluation items or indexes in this section.
First, we give a formal definition for weighted functions.
Definition 4.1 For a tendering A˜ =
m⋃
i=1
Ai, where Ai = {ai1, ai2, · · · , ain}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
with k bidders R1, R2, · · · , Rk, if there is a continuous function ω : A˜ → [a, b] ⊂
(−∞,+∞) or ω : Ai → [a, b] ⊂ (−∞,+∞), 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that for any integers
l, s, 1 ≤ l, s ≤ k, Rl(ω(A˜)) > Rs(ω(A˜)) or Rl(ω(A˜)) = Rs(ω(A˜)) as Rl(A˜) ≻ Rs(A˜)
or Rl(A˜) ≈ Rs(A˜) and Rl(ω(Ai) > Rs(ω(Ai)) or Rl(ω(Ai)) = Rs(ω(Ai)) as Rl(Ai) ≻
Rs(Ai) or Rl(Ai) ≈ Rs(Ai), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then ω is called a weighted function for the
tendering A˜ or the evaluation items Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
According to the decision theory of multiple objectives([3]), the weighted function
ω(Ai) must exists for any integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. but generally, the weight function
ω(A˜) does not exist if the values of these evaluation items A1, A2, · · · , Am can not
compare. There are two choice for the weighted function ω(Ai).
Choice 1 the monotone functions in the interval [a, b], such as the linear functions.
Choice 2 The continuous functions only with one maximum value in the interval
[a, b], such as ω(Ai) = −2x
2 + 6x+ 12 or
ω(Ai) =
{
x, if 0 ≤ x ≤ 2,
−x+ 4, if x ≥ 4.
As examples of concrete weighted functions ω, we discuss the tendering of civil
engineering constructions.
4.1. The weighted function for the bidding price
Let A1 be the bidding price. We often encounter the following weighted function
ω(A1) in practice.
ω(Ri(A1)) = −ς ×
Ri(A1)− S
S
+ ζ
where,
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S =
R1(A1) +R2(A1) + · · ·+Rk(A1)
k
or
S =
{
R1(A1)+R2(A1)+···+Rk(A1)−M−N
k−2
, k ≥ 5,
R1(A1)+R2(A1)+···+Rk(A1)
k
, 3 ≤ k ≤ 4
or
S = T × A%+
R1(A1) +R2(A1) + · · ·+Rk(A1)
k
× (1− A%).
Where T ,A%,k, M and N are the pre-price of the tender, the percentage of T in S,
the number of bidders and the maximum and minimum bidding price, respectively,
Ri(A1), i = 1, 2, · · · , k denote the bidding prices and ς, ζ are both constants.
There is a postulate in these weighted functions, i.e., each bidding price is random
and accord with the normal distribution. Then the best excepted value of this civil
engineering is the arithmetic mean of these bidding prices. However, each bidding
price is not random in fact. It reflects the bidder’s expected value and subjectivity
in a tendering. We can not apply any definite mathematics to fix its real value.
Therefore, this formula for a weighted function can be only seen as a game, not a
scientific decision.
By the view of scientific decision, we can apply weighted functions according to
the expected value and its cost in the market, such as
(1) the linear function
ω(Ri(A1)) = −p×
Ri(A1)−N
M −N
+ q
in the interval [N,M ], where M,N are the maximum and minimum bidding prices
p is the deduction constant and q is a constant such that Ri(ω(A1)) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The objective of this approach is seek a lower bidding price.
(2) non-linear functions in the interval [N,M ], such as
ω(Ri(A1)) = −p×
Ri(A1)−
T+
k∑
j=1
Ri(A1)
k+1
+
q,
ω(Ri(A1)) = −p×
Ri(A1)−
k+1
√
R1(A1)R2(A1) · · ·Rk(A1)T
k+1
√
R1(A1)R2(A1) · · ·Rk(A1)T
+ q
or
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ω(Ri(A1)) = −p×
Ri(A1)−
√
R2
1
(A1)+R22(A1)+···+R
2
k
(A1)+T 2
k+1√
R2
1
(A1)+R22(A1)+···+R
2
k
(A1)+T 2
k+1
+ q
etc.. If we wish to analog a curve for these bidding prices and choose a point on this
curve as ω(Ri(A1)), we can apply the value of a polynomial of degree k + 1
f(x) = ak+1x
k+1 + akx
k + · · ·+ a1x+ a0
by the undetermined coefficient method. Arrange the bidding prices and pre-price
of the tender from lower to higher. Not loss of generality, let it be Rj1(A1) ≻
R(j2)(A1) ≻ · · · ≻ T ≻ · · · ≻ Rjk(A1). Choose k + 2 constants c1 > c2 > · · · >
ck+1 > 0, for instance k + 1 > k > · · · > 1 > 0. Solving the equation system
Rj1(A1) = ak+1c
k+1
1 + akc
k
1 + · · ·+ a1c1 + a0
Rj2(A1) = ak+1c
k+1
2 + akc
k
2 + · · ·+ a1c2 + a0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Rjk−1(A1) = ak+1c
k+1
k + akc
k
k + · · ·+ a1ck + a0
Rjk(A1) = a0
we get a polynomial f(x) of degree k + 1. The bidding price has an acceptable
difference in practice. Whence, we also need to provide a bound for the difference
which does not affect the ordered sequence of bids.
4.2. The weighted function for the programming
Let A2 be the evaluation item of programming with evaluation indexes {a21, a22,
· · · , a2n2}. It is difficult to evaluating a programming in quantify, which is not only
for the tender, but also for the evaluation specialists. In general, any two indexes of
A2 are not comparable. Whence it is not scientific assigning numbers for each index
since we can not explain why the mark of a programming is 96 but another is 88.
This means that it should qualitatively evaluate a programming or a quantify after
a qualitatively evaluation. Its weight function ω(Ri(A2)), 1 ≤ i ≤ k can be chosen
as a linear function
ω(Ri(A2)) = ω(Ri(a21)) + ω(Ri(a22)) + · · ·+ ω(Ri(a2n2)).
For example, there are 4 evaluation indexes for the programming, and each with
A,B,C,D ranks in a tendering. The corespondent mark for each rank is in table 7.
index a21 a22 a23 a24
A 4 2 2 1
B 3 1.5 1.5 0.8
C 2 1 1 0.5
D 1 0.5 0.5 0.3
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table 7¸
If the evaluation results for a bidding programming Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 are ω(Ri(a21)) =
A, ω(Ri(a22)) = B, ω(Ri(a23)) = B and ω(Ri(a24)) = A, then the mark of this pro-
gramming is
Ri(ω(A2)) = Ri(ω(a21)) +Ri(ω(a22)) +Ri(ω(a23)) +Ri(ω(a24))
= 4 + 3 + 1.5 + 1 = 9.5.
By the approach in Section 3, we can alphabetically or graphicly arrange the
order of these programming if we can determine the rank of each programming.
Certainly, we need the order of these indexes for a programming first. The index
order for programming is different for different constructions tendering.
§5. Further discussions
5.1 Let A˜ =
m⋃
i=1
Ai be a Smarandache multi-space with an operation set O(A˜) =
{◦i; 1 ≤ i ≤ m}. If there is a mapping Θ on A˜ such that Θ(A˜) is also a Smarandache
multi-space, then (A˜,Θ) is called a pseudo-multi-space. Today, nearly all geometries,
such as the Riemann geometry, Finsler geometry and these pseudo-manifold geome-
tries are particular cases of pseudo-multi-geometries.
For applying Smarandache multi-spaces to an evaluation system, choose Θ(A˜)
being an order set. Then Theorem 3.1 only asserts that any subset of Θ(A˜) is an
order set, which enables us to find the ordered sequence for all bids in a tendering.
Particularly, if Θ(A˜) is continuous and Θ(A˜) ⊆ [−∞,+∞], then Θ is a weighted
function on A˜ widely applied in the evaluation of bids in China. By a mathematical
view, many problems on (A˜,Θ) is valuable to research. Some open problems are
presented in the following.
Problem 5.1 Characterize these pseudo-multi-spaces (A˜,Θ), particularly, for these
cases of Θ(A˜) =
n⋃
i=1
[ai, bi], Θ(A˜) =
n⋃
i=1
(Gi, ◦i) and Θ(A˜) =
n⋃
i=1
(R; +i, ◦i) with (Gi, ◦i)
and (R; +i, ◦i) being a finite group or a ring for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Problem 5.2 Let Θ(A˜) be a group, a ring or a filed. Can we find an ordered sequence
for a finite subset of A˜?
Problem 5.3 Let Θ(A˜) be n lines or n planes in an Euclid space Rn. Characterize
these pseudo-multi-spaces (A˜,Θ). Can we find an arrangement for a finite subset of
A˜?
5.2 The evaluation approach in this paper can be also applied to evaluate any multi-
ple objectives, such as the evaluation of a scientific project, a personal management
system, an investment of a project, · · ·, etc..
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